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Abstract— This paper is concerned with understanding and
countering the effects of database attacks on a learning-based
linear quadratic adaptive controller. This attack targets neither
sensors nor actuators, but just poisons the learning algorithm
and parameter estimator that is part of the regulation scheme.
We focus on the adaptive optimal control algorithm introduced
by Abbasi-Yadkori and Szepesvari and provide regret analysis
in the presence of attacks as well as modifications that mitigate
their effects. A core step of this algorithm is the self-regularized
on-line least squares estimation, which determines a tight
confidence set around the true parameters of the system with
high probability. In the absence of malicious data injection,
this set provides an appropriate estimate of parameters for the
aim of control design. However, in the presence of attack, this
confidence set is not reliable anymore. Hence, we first tackle
the question of how to adjust the confidence set so that it
can compensate for the effect of the poisonous data. Then, we
quantify the deleterious effect of this type of attack on the
optimality of control policy by providing a measure that we
call attack regret.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are complex platforms
comprised of interacting physical and engineered compo-
nents integrated through computing and communication ca-
pabilities [1]. These networked components can be sensors,
actuators, control units, and even learning agents. There is
a vast area of applications for CPS including intelligent
transportation systems, robotics, and smart grids, to name but
a few, which are highly safety critical [2]. These complex
platforms are very vulnerable to malicious data injection
by adversary agents, who can target any components such
as sensors and actuators. As such, designing control and
estimation algorithms that can make the system resilient
against adversarial signals and attacks has received an ever-
increasing attention. CPS security is typically addressed
in one of two ways. The first avenue is to identify the
misbehaving corrupted agents and exclude them. The second
approach tackles the problem by designing a resilient control
algorithm that can mitigate the attacks [3]. A widely-applied
paradigm of the second category attempts to apply game
theory and optimal control to design such resilient control
protocols [4], [5]. In the game-theoretic formulation, the
attacker tries to exploit the system and poison the sensors or
actuators while the system’s defender attempts to mitigate the
attack and attenuate performance loss. To solve the optimal
control problem of this setting when there is no knowledge
of systems parameters, Reinforcement Learning (RL) has
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shown its effectiveness. RL is applied in [6], [7] to obtain the
optimal control policies through solving Hamilton-Jacobi-
Belman (HJB) equation. Although the malicious agents usu-
ally targets sensors and actuators, increased complexity of
CPS systems is constantly opening new angles of attack for
the adversarial agents bringing about dramatically increasing
vulnerability. One possible angle of attack can be the learning
algorithm of the control unit. As a first approach towards
studying this new attack modality, we consider a situation
where an unknown linear system controlled by an adaptive
control algorithm undergoes a learning algorithm attack.
This situation can be seen as a special case of data
poisoning attacks on machine learning algorithms as studied,
e.g., in [8], [9]. An additional complication in the context of
adaptive control, however, is that the learning algorithm is
in the loop, driving the process to be controlled. The effects
of this additional closed loop are not intuitively clear. On
the one hand, one may reason that the attack will be more
damaging, since false data not only triggers mis-estimation
of the system’s model, but this mis-estimation may itself
result in the computation and injection of an incorrect control
input signal, further driving the system’s state away from
its desired optimal value. On the other hand, one could
argue that because the controller constantly adapts itself and
receives new measurements, it might be able to correct the
effects of an attack if it is limited in space and time.This class
of attacks also belongs to the family of so-called false data
injection attacks encountered in the field of secure control of
CPS (see, e.g., [10]). What sets them apart within this class,
however, is that the injection targets data stored for learning
purposes, as opposed to the direct sensor outputs.
A classic approach for adaptive control is to use so-
called certainty equivalence principle whereby an estimate
of the system’s unknown parameters is first obtained and
then treating them as true parameters an optimal law is
designed. However, as this simple philosophy decouples the
estimation problem from control one, it may lead to strictly
sub-optimal performance [11]. There are a limited number of
research works that attempt to handle this challenge dealing
with LQR systems from a model-based RL perspective.
Campi and Kumar in [11] by introducing a cost-biased
parameter estimator and using the Optimism in the Face
of Uncertainty (OFU) principle proposed an algorithm to
address the optimal control problem for linear quadratic
Gaussian systems with guaranteed asymptotic optimality.
However, their analysis lacks a regret bound in finite time
and only shows that the average cost converges to that of the
optimal control in limit. Abbsi-Yadkori and Szepesvari for
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
00
24
1v
1 
 [e
es
s.S
Y]
  1
 A
pr
 20
20
the first time applied a learning-based algorithm to address
the adaptive optimal control problem with a guaranteed regret
bound of O(√T) type in T rounds. They proposed a self-
regularized online linear estimation algorithm to provide a
high probability confidence set around the true parameters of
the system [12] and applied this estimation approach coupled
with OFU to design control policy for linear quadratic setting
[13]. Along similar lines, Ibrahimi et al. [14] later proposed
an algorithm that achieves O(p√T) regret bound with state
space dimension of p. Furthermore, authors in [15] proposed
an OFU-based learning algorithm with mild assumptions and
O(√T) regret. Recently, Cohen et al. [16] while keeping
loyalty for the main idea of the algorithm in [13] proposed
a computationally efficient algorithm by formulating the
LQ control problem in a convex semi-definite programming
(SDP) fashion and, as such, resolved the open question of
the literature.
In order to quantitatively assess the effect of learning
attacks (and settle the question raised above regarding their
effects), we place ourselves within the framework of LQ
adaptive control and consider a learning-based algorithm for
which rigorous regret bounds are available [13]. Building
on the approach of [13], our results take the form of new
regret bounds established in the presence of a special kind
of attack on the learning algorithm, which we call "database
attacks" and of a correction mechanism in the controller.
These bounds appear to be tight in simulations, and point
towards a way of modifying the confidence set of [13]’s
algorithm so as to guarantee a linear regret under attack,
even though the original algorithm exhibits much worse
performance. The "database attacks" which we consider (and
which are motivated and described in more details in Section
III) assume that correct instantaneous state measurements are
available to the controller but that data stored for learning
purposes is tampered with in a remote "database".
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
Section II reviews the preliminaries and background. Section
III presents the formulation of adaptive optimal control and
provides a confidence set and a regret bound of the LQR
control system in the presence of the attack. Finally, Section
IV summarizes the paper’s key contributions by providing
simulation results.
II. ASSUMPTIONS, PRELIMINARIES AND BACKGROUND
In this section a background review of optimal adaptive
control of a LQ system is presented. This section summarizes
the key results of [13] and [12].
Consider the following linear time invariant dynamics and
the associated cost functional given by:
xt+1 = A∗xt +B∗ut +ωt+1 (1a)
ct = xTt Qxt +uTt Qut (1b)
where the plant and input matrices A∗ ∈ Rn×n and B∗ ∈ Rn×m
are initially unknown and have to be learned. Q ∈ Rn×n and
R ∈Rm×m represent known and positive definite matrices and
ωt+1 is noise signal. The associated average expected cost
based on the past observations is written as:
J(pi) = lim
T→∞ 1T
T∑
t=1E[ct] (2)
where u0, u1,..., uT−1 are chosen based on the policy pi
starting from x0.
The regret of this strategy is defined as
RT = T∑
t=1(E[ct]−J∗) (3)
where J∗ is the cost of optimal control strategy computed
with knowledge of the matrices A∗ and B∗. RT is a measure
of how much the lack of insight into the model affects
performance. Following [13] we assume that the system is
controllable and observable. By defining,
ΘT∗ = (A∗, B∗) (4)
the system transitions dynamics can be rewritten as:
xt+1 =ΘT∗zt +ωt+1, zt = (xtut) (5)
In the analysis of our setting we will make the following
core assumptions, as in [13].
Assumption (1): Let the sets S0 and S1 be defined as follows:
S0 = {Θ ∈ R(n+m)×n ∣ trace(ΘTΘ) ≤ s2} for some s > 0,
S1 = {Θ = (A,B) ∈ R(n+m)×n ∣ (A,B) is controllable,(A,M) is observable, where Q =MT M}
Then, Θ∗ belongs to the intersection of these sets, i.e. Θ∗ ∈ S
where S ⊂ S0∩S1.
Assumption (2):
There exists a filtration Ft such that(2.1) zt and xt are Ft -measurable.(2.2) for any t ≥ 0,
E[xt+1∣Ft] =ΘT∗zt(2.3) E[ωt+1ωTt+1∣Ft] = In;(2.4) ωt are component-wise sub-Gaussian i.e. there exists
L > 0 such that for any γ ∈ R and j = 1,2, ...,n
E[eγ(ωt+1) j ∣Ft] ≤ eγ2L2/2.
Using the self-normalized process, the least square estima-
tion error up to time t, e(Θ) can be obtained as:
e(Θ) = λ Tr(ΘTΘ)+ t−1∑
s=0Tr((xs+1−ΘT zs)(xs+1−ΘT zs)T )).
(6)
This yields the l2-regularized least square estimate:
Θˆt = argmin
Θ
e(Θ) = (ZTt Zt +λ I)−1ZTt Xt (7)
where Zt and Xt are matrices whose rows are zT0 , ...,z
T
t−1
and xT1 , ...,x
T
t , respectively and λ is a regularization param-
eter.
Defining covariance matrix Vt as follows:
Vt = λ I+ t−1∑
s=0zszTs = λ I+ZTt Zt ,
[13] shows that with probability at least (1−δ), where 0< δ <
1, the true parameters of system Θ∗ belong to the confidence
set defined by:
Ct(δ) = {Θ ∈ Rn×(n+m) ∣ Tr((Θˆt −Θ)TVt(Θˆt −Θ)) ≤ βt(δ)}
(8)
where
β(δ) = (nL√2log(det(Vt)1/2 det(λ I)−1/2
δ
)+λ 1/2s)2. (9)
By the controllability and observability assumptions on(A,B) (assumption 1) there exists a unique positive definite
solution P(Θ) to the algebraic Riccati equation (ARE):
P(Θ) =Q+AT P(Θ)A−AT P(Θ)B(BT P(Θ)B+R)−1BT P(Θ)A.
for all (A,B) ∈ S. Under this assumption the linear optimal
control law u(t) =K(P(Θ))x(t) where
K(Θ) = −(BT P(Θ)B+R)−1BT P(Θ)A.
is stabilizing, i.e.∥(A+BK(Θ))∥ < 1 and the average cost of
control law with Θ =Θ∗ is the optimal average cost J(Θ∗) =
trace(P(Θ∗)).
In addition, boundedness of S results in boundedness of
P(Θ) and K(Θ) with constants D and C respectively:
D = Sup{∥P(Θ)∥ ∣Θ ∈ S},
C = SupΘ∈S∣∣K(Θ)∣∣ <∞.
After finding high-probability confidence sets for the un-
known parameter, the core step of the algorithm proposed
in [13] is implementing the Optimism in the Face of Uncer-
tainty (OFU) principle. At any time t, we choose a parameter
Θ˜t ∈ S∩Ct(δ) such that:
J(Θ˜t) ≤ inf
Θ∈Ct(δ)∩SJ(Θ)+ 1√t . (10)
Then, by using the chosen parameters as if they were the true
parameters, a stabilizing controller is designed by solving
the Riccati equation. As can be seen in the regret bound
analysis of [13], recurrent switches in policy may worsen
the performance, so a criterion is needed to prevent frequent
policy switches. As such, at each time step t the algo-
rithm checks the condition det(Vt) > 2det(Vt−1) to determine
whether updates to the control policy are needed. Algorithm
1, adopted from [13], provides the detail procedure.
The policy explicited in Algorithm 1 keeps the states of
the underlying system bounded with high probability 1−δ
which is defined as the "good event" Ft :
Ft = {ω ∈Ω ∣ ∀s ≤ t,∥xs∥ ≤ αt}. (11)
A second "good event" is associated with the confidence set
defined as:
Et = {ω ∈Ω ∣ ∀s ≤ t,Θ∗ ∈Cs(δ/4)} (12)
Algorithm 1 Adaptive Algorithm for LQ control problem
1: Inputs:T,s > 0,δ > 0,Q ,L, λ > 0
2: set V0 = λ I and Θˆ = 0
3: Θ˜0 = arg minΘ∈C0(δ)∩S J(Θ)
4: for t = 0,1,2, ... do
5: if det(Vt) > 2det(Vτ) or t = 0 then
6: Calculate Θˆt by (7) and set τ = t
7: Find Θ˜t such that J(Θ˜t) ≤ infΘ∈Ct(δ)∩S J(Θ)+ 1√t .
8: else
9: Θ˜t = Θ˜t−1
10: end if
11: For the parameter Θ˜t solve ARE and calculate ut =
K(Θ˜t)xt
12: Apply the control and observe new state xt+1.
13: Save (zt ,xt+1) into dataset
14: Vt+1 =Vt + ztzTt
15: end for
where both good events are defined in probability space Ω
and αt has been explicited in [13].
Finally, if we let E = ET and F = FT , then it is proven in
[13] that intersection of E and F holds with high probability
i.e. P(E ∩F) ≥ 1−δ/2.
By an appropriate decomposition of regret on the event
E ∩F , it is also shown that:
RT ≤ R1−R2−R3+2√T (13)
where
R1 = T∑
t=0(xTt P(Θ˜t)xt −E[xTt+1P( ˜Θt+1)xt+1∣Ft]) (14)
R2 = T∑
t=0E[xTt+1(P(Θ˜t)−P(Θ˜t+1))xt+1∣Ft] (15)
and
R3 = T∑
t=0((A˜txt + B˜tut)T P(Θ˜t)(A˜txt + B˜tut)−(A∗xt +B∗ut)T P(Θ˜t+1)(A∗xt +B∗ut)) (16)
By bounding the above terms separately, for any T it is
shown that with probability at least 1−δ , the imposed regret
is:
R ≤ 2DW 2√2T log 8
δ
+n√B′δ +2DX2T (n+m)
log2(1+2T /λ(X2T (1+C2)))+ 8√λ ((1+C2)X2T )
sD
√
βT (δ/4)⎛⎝ log det(Vt)det(λ I)⎞⎠
1/2√
T (17)
where max1≤s≤T ∣∣xs∣∣ ≤XT , W = Ln√2n log(8n/δ) (from sub-
Gaussianity assumption) and definition of B′δ is provided in
[13]. As can be seen, the regret is O(√T) up to time T .
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND FORMULATION
We are interested in the situation depicted in Figure 1,
where a controller designed based on Algorithm 1 operates
in an adversarial environment.
As can be seen in Figure 1, at each time instant t, the
plant’s state xat is sent both to the controller block (to
compute and implement control input uat = K(Θ˜t)xt ), and
to a database, where it is used to generate the covariance
matrices Zs,s ≥ t which are involved in the estimation of Θ
from then on. Note the “a” superscript will be used from
now on to denote the fact that we are considering state and
control input of a system under attack (as opposed to the
discussion of Section II). A similar notation will be used
for extended state zat as well, which contains both state and
control input of the attacked system at t.
In the most general scenario, an attacker would likely
disrupt all elements of the feedback loop, from poisoning the
data stored in the database to blocking the transmission of
the control input to modifying the estimation algorithm, and
it would be necessary for the control schemes to be robust,
in some sense, to all these manipulations. However, since the
role played by stored data is unique to the control scheme
presented in Section II, we focus solely on data poisoning
attacks on the database in this work. We will henceforth refer
to this attack model as a "database attack".
Accordingly, we assume that, at time t, (1) the controller
receives the correct value xat and, (2) this value is also
correctly stored in the database at time t. However, (3) the
attacker poisons the values of the state xa1, ...,x
a
t−1 stored in
the database and replaces them by
x¯s = xas +ηs (18)
where ηs is an a priori bounded signal unknown to the
controller. Item (2) above is meant to capture the fact that
data is checked as it is deposited in the database but not later
(in such a way that a modification of xat at time t could simply
be noticed by comparing the stored value with that received
by the controller, thus rendering such an attack useless).
Other similar restrictions on the values that the attacker is
permitted to modify in the database at time t (e.g., xai for
i ≤ t −k) could also be considered without affecting much of
our analysis, as a way to account for longer memory at the
controller.
We would argue, however, that once an implementation
that separates "controller"-block and "database" has been
chosen, it is natural to expect that this memory is finite and
short (since, presumably, the reason why a database is used
is that the controller has reduced storage space), thus making
it possible for the attacker to modify at least some stored past
values of the state at each time t without being noticed.
Under this attack model, the dynamics of the stored
poisoned data is given by
X¯t = Zat Θ∗+Wt +Ht . (19)
where X¯t and Zat are matrices whose rows are x¯
T
1 , ..., x¯
T
t and
zaT0 , ...,z
aT
t−1 respectively. Also, Ht is a matrix constructed by
rows ηT1 , ...,η
T
t−1,0T and Wt is a matrix with rows,ωT1 , ...,ωTt .
Fig. 1: Diagram of a closed-loop system with the learning block, attacked in the loop
Fig. 2: Degraded performance of the "naive" algorithm under database attack. Top.
estimation of naive algorithm, bottom. Naive algorithm’s regret. See text for details.
Then,for history of data Z¯t given by dataset we have:
Z¯t = Zat +Yt (20)
where Yt is a matrix constructed by rows ζ T1 , ...,ζ
T
t defined
as follows:
ζt = ( ηt+10(m×1))
Having Z¯t as the matrices whose rows are z¯T1 , ..., z¯
T
t−1, similar
to (6,7), the normalized least square error can be written as:
e(Θ) = λ Tr(ΘTΘ)+ t−1∑
s=0Tr((x¯s+1−ΘT z¯s)(x¯s+1−ΘT z¯s)T )
(21a)
Θˆat = argmin
Θ
e(Θ) = (Z¯t T Z¯t +λ I)−1Z¯t T X¯t . (21b)
As a result of matrix Zat being replaced by Z¯t in (21b),
the system’s parameters are misestimated, which in turn
may result in poor performance of the controller or even
destabilization of the closed loop if Algorithm 1 is just
implemented as-is.
An example of this behavior is provided in Figure 2 which
displays the estimate (top) and regret (bottom) of a ’naive’
controller designed using Algorithm 1 as-is in the face of data
attacks of the kind described above. We consider a simple
control system:
xt+1 = axt +but +ωt+1 (22)
where we set a = 0.001, b = 0.001, R = 1/10, Q = 1 and
assume that Assumption 1 holds. The inputs to the OFU
algorithm are T = 8000, δ = 1/T , λ = 1, L = 0.1, s = 1 and we
repeat simulation 50 times. The detail of solving constrained
optimization problem of the algorithm is discussed in Section
IV.
As can be seen in Figure 2, the regret of the naive algo-
rithm appears to become linear under attack, even though,
as shown in (17), it is provably sub-linear O(√T) in the
non-attacked case.
Our goal, in the remainder of this paper, is to modify the
basic algorithm described in Section II to be able to weather
database attacks (in the sense of preserving sub-linear regret
and guaranteeing a bounded state with high probability).
We show that this can be achieved by retaining the general
structure outlined in Algorithm 1 while modifying the confi-
dence bound βt(δ) on the estimate Θat . We call the resulting
controller "self-correcting" because it continuously modifies
the value of βt(δ) to account for the effects of database
attacks.
Since this new bound is used to define the set Ct(δ) which
explicitly appears in the algorithm, it must be computable
without precise knowledge of the attack signal and only in
terms of the a priori bounds on η . With this bound in hand,
we can also prove a sub-linear bound on the regret of the
self-correcting controller.
Before stating our main results, we give the following
lemma, adapted from [12] which gives a self-normalized
bound for vector-valued martingales. We will later use this
result in our proofs.
Lemma 1: Let Fk be a filtration, z¯k be a vector-valued
stochastic process adapted to Fk and ωk be real-valued
martingale difference, again adapted to filtration Fk which
satisfies the conditionally sub-Gaussianity assumption (As-
sumption 2.4) with known constant L. Consider the martin-
gale and co-variance matrices:
St ∶= t∑
s=1 z¯s−1ωs = Z¯Tt Wt , V¯t = λ I+
t−1∑
s=1 z¯sz¯Ts
then with probability of at least 1−δ , 0 < δ < 1 we have,
∥St∥2V¯−1t ≤ 2L2(det(V¯t)1/2 det(λ I)−1/2δ ) (23)
Proof: Proof has been provided in Theorem 3 and
Corollary 1 in[13].
Also, the following lemma which provides an upper bound
for det(V¯t) is useful for the rest of analysis.
Lemma 2:
det(V¯t) ≤ ⎛⎝(n+m)λ +2∑t−1k=1(∥zak∥
2+∥ζk∥2)
n+m ⎞⎠
n+m
(24)
Proof: For a positive definite matrix M, we have
det(M)≤ det(M¯) where M¯ is a matrix with zero off-diagonal
elements and diagonal elements equal to those of M. Hence,
for det(V¯t) we have:
det(V¯t) ≤ n+m∏
i=1 (λ +
t−1∑
k=1(zaki+ζki)2)
≤ (∑n+mi=1 (λ +∑t−1k=1(zaki+ζki)2)
n+m )n+m
≤ (∑n+mi=1 (λ +2∑t−1k=1(za2ki +ζ 2ki))
n+m )n+m
= ⎛⎝(n+m)λ +2∑t−1k=1(∥zak∥
2+∥ζk∥2)
n+m ⎞⎠
n+m
(25)
In second inequality we applied AM-GM inequality and in
the third inequality we apply the property (a+b)2 ≤ 2a2+2b2
A. Confidence Set in the Presence of Database Attack
As explained earlier, our first goal is to provide a new
confidence bound on the error of parameter estimates in the
presence of a database attack. This is the content of the
following theorem.
Theorem 1: Let Assumption 1 hold (e.g. ∥Θ∗∥ ≤ s) and
assume the linear model represented in (5) satisfies Assump-
tion 2 with a known L. Let Θˆat denote the least square
estimate and V¯t = λ I +∑t−1s=1 z¯sz¯Ts be co-variance matrix, then
with probability at least 1−δ we have:
Tr((Θˆat −Θ∗)TVt(Θˆat −Θ∗)) ≤ β at (δ) (26)
where
β at (δ) = ⎛⎝nL
√
2log(det(V¯t)1/2 det(λ I)−1/2
δ
+
1/√λ ∥Z¯Tt Ht∥+(√λ +1/√λ ∥Z¯Tt Yt∥)s⎞⎠
2
(27)
if, in addition, max1≤s≤t ∣∣xas ∣∣ ≤Xa,t , ∥ηt∥ ≤Λ, and ∥ζt∥ ≤Λ ∀t,
the following statement holds with probability at least 1−δ
β at (δ) ≤ ⎛⎝nL
¿ÁÁÀp log( pλ +2t((1+C2)X2a,t +Λ2)
pδλ
+
1/√λRΛt +(√λ +1/√λRΛt)S⎞⎠
2
(28)
in which p ∶= n+m.
Proof: Substituting (19) into (21b) gives:
Θˆat = (Z¯Tt Z¯t +λ I)−1Z¯Tt (Zat Θ∗+Wt +Ht). (29)
And then implementing (20) yields,
Θˆat = (Z¯Tt Z¯t +λ I)−1Z¯Tt ((Z¯t −Yt)Θ∗+Wt +Ht) =(Z¯Tt Z¯t +λ I)−1Z¯Tt (Wt +Ht)−(Z¯Tt Z¯t +λ I)−1Z¯Tt YtΘ∗+(Z¯Tt Z¯t +λ I)−1Z¯Tt Z¯tΘ∗ (30)
The last term in right hand side can be rewritten as follows:(Z¯Tt Z¯t +λ I)−1Z¯Tt Z¯tΘ∗ = (Z¯Tt Z¯t +λ I)−1(Z¯Tt Z¯t +λ I)Θ∗−
λ(Z¯Tt Z¯t +λ I)−1Θ∗
now, using V¯t = Z¯Tt Z¯t +λ I (30) yields:
Θˆat −Θ∗ = V¯−1t Z¯Tt (Wt +Ht)+V¯−1t (λ I+ Z¯Tt Yt)Θ∗ (31)
For an arbitrary random covariate z we have,
zT Θˆt − zTΘ∗ = ⟨z, Z¯TW ⟩V¯−1t + ⟨z, Z¯T H⟩V¯−1t + ⟨z,(λ I+ Z¯TY)Θ∗⟩V¯−1t
(32)
taking norm on both sides and considering the fact that∥Θ∗∥2V¯−1t ≤ 1/λ ∥Θ∗∥2 then we would have:
∥zT Θˆt − zTΘ∗∥ ≤ ∥z∥V¯−1t ⎛⎝∥Z¯Tt Wt∥V¯−1t +∥Z¯Tt Ht∥V¯−1t +
∥λ¯ I+ Z¯Tt Yt∥∥Θ∗∥V¯−1t ⎞⎠ ≤ ∥z∥V¯−1t ⎛⎝∥Z¯Tt Wt∥V¯−1t +
1/√λ ∥Z¯Tt Ht∥+(√λ +1/√λ ∥Z¯Tt Yt∥)∥Θ∗∥⎞⎠
(33)
Using Lemma 1, ∥Z¯Tt Wt∥V¯−1t is bounded from above as:
∥Z¯Tt Wt∥V¯−1t ≤ nL
√
2log(det(V¯t)1/2 det(λ I)−1/2
δ
. (34)
As a result, with probability at least 1−δ we will have,
∥zT Θˆt − zTΘ∗∥ ≤ ∥z∥V¯−1t ⎛⎝nL
√
2log(det(V¯t)1/2 det(λ I)−1/2
δ
+
1/√λ ∥Z¯Tt Ht∥+(√λ +1/√λ ∥Z¯Tt Yt∥)∥Θ∗∥⎞⎠
(35)
In particular, choosing z = V¯t(Θˆat −Θ∗) and plugging it into
(35) yields:
∥Θˆat −Θ∗∥2V¯t ≤ ∥V¯t(Θˆat −Θ∗)∥V¯−1t⎛⎝nL
√
2log(det(V¯t)1/2 det(λ I)−1/2
δ
+
1/√λ ∥Z¯T H∥+(√λ +1/√λ ∥Z¯TY∥)∥Θ∗∥⎞⎠
(36)
and since ∥Θˆat −Θ∗∥V¯t =∥V¯t(Θˆat −Θ∗)∥V¯−1t , the statement (26-27)
holds. By applying Lemma 2, using the upper bounds for
the norms ∥Θ∗∥, ∥Z¯TY∥, ∥Z¯T H∥ and elementary calculations
the second part of theorem (28) can be shown.
B. Regret Bound Analysis of Attacked System
In this part, we analyze the regret bound of the self-
correcting controller under database attack. The general form
of regret bound analysis for an unattacked system presented
in (13-16) is directly applicable to this case as well except
for the fact that the attack signal η is unknown a priori. This
requires us to establish new upper bounds on terms R1, R2,
and R3 under attack. However, before proceeding to this, we
are required to define the associated "good events" for the
attacked system setting. Similar to (11) and (12) we define:
Fat = {ω ∈Ω ∣ ∀s ≤ t,∥xas ∥ ≤ αat } (37a)
Eat = {ω ∈Ω ∣ ∀s ≤ t,Θ∗ ∈Cas (δ/4)} (37b)
where Cat is defined as follows:
Cat (δ) = {Θ ∈ Rn×(n+d) ∣ Tr((Θˆat −Θ)T V¯t(Θˆat −Θ)) ≤ β at (δ)}
(38)
and where β at is defined by Theorem 1 and αat will be
introduced later. The following lemma bounds 1(Fa∩Ea)R1
where 1A is the indicator function of event A.
Lemma 3: Let R1 be defined by (14), then with probability
at least 1−δ/2 we have:
1(F∩E)R1 ≤ 2DW 2√2T log 8δ +n√B′a,δ (39)
where W = Ln√2n log(8nT /δ) and
B′a,δ = (ν +T D2S2X2a,T (1+C2))×
log(4nv−1/2
δ
√
ν +T D2S2X2a,T (1+C2)) (40)
Proof: Proof follows from lemmas 6 and 7 in [13].
Consider (15) and Algorithm 1, it is clear that most of the
terms of R2 take zero value except those times that algorithm
has switch in policy. The following lemma provides an upper
bound for R2 conditioned to the satisfaction of both good
events Fa∩Ea.
Lemma 4: Consider R2 depicted in (15), we have:
1(F∩E)∣R2∣ ≤ 2DX2a,T (n+d) log2(1+2T /λ(X2a,T (1+C2)+Λ))
(41)
where max1≤s≤t ∥ηt∥ ≤Λt and max1≤s≤T ∥xat ∥ ≤ Xa,T .
Proof: Proof follows the same steps as lemma 1 in
[13]. Let us assume at time steps tn1 , ...,tnN the algorithm
1 changes the policy. Therefore, we have det(Vtn1 ) ≥ 2λ n+m
and det(VtnN ) ≥ 2N−1 det(Vtn1 ). On the other hand we have:
λmax(VT ) ≤ λ +T−1∑
s=0 ∥z¯s∥2 = λ +
T−1∑
s=0 ∥zas +ζs∥2
≤ λ +2T−1∑
s=0(∥zas∥2+∥ζs∥2) ≤
λ +2T(X2a,T (1+C2)+Λ2T ) (42)
and also we have det(VT )≤λmax(VT )n+d that together with in-
equality (42) provides an upper bound for the number of
policy switches N:
N ≤ (n+m) log2(1+2T /λ(X2a,T (1+C2)+Λ)) (43)
Then given (15), the maximum number of switches in policy
(43) and upper bound for P completes the proof.
To bound the term R3 we follow same steps as in [13].
However, we are required to express this bound in terms
of states and extended states of the attacked system, xat and
zat respectively. We borrow Lemma 3 from [12].
Lemma 5: The following holds for t ≥ 1:
t−1∑
s=0
⎛⎝∥z¯s∥2V¯−1s ∧1⎞⎠ ≤ 2log det(V¯t)det(λ I) (44)
where (a∧b) denotes the minimum of a and b.
The proof is in [12]. To bound the term ∣R3∣, it is required to
find an upper bound for the summation ∑Tt=0 ∥(Θ∗− Θ˜∗)zat ∥2.
The following lemma provides this upper bound.
Lemma 6: The following holds for t ≥ 1:
T∑
s=0∥(Θ∗− Θ˜∗)zas∥2 ≤ 16λ ((1+C2)X2a,T +Λ2T )β aT (δ/4)⎛⎝2log det(V¯T )det(λ I) + T∑s=0(∥ζs∥2V¯−1s ∧ 12)⎞⎠
(45)
Proof: From Lemma 12 of [13] we have the first
inequality which is bounded above as follows:
T∑
s=0∥(Θ∗− Θ˜∗)zas∥2 ≤ 8λ ((1+C2)X2a,T +Λ2T )β aT (δ/4)
T∑
s=0
⎛⎝∥zas∥2V¯−1s ∧1⎞⎠ = 8λ ((1+C2)X2a,T +Λ2)β aT (δ/4)
T∑
s=0(∥z¯s−ζs∥2V¯−1s ∧1) ≤ 8λ ((1+C2)X2a,T +Λ2)β aT (δ/4)
T∑
s=0(2∥z¯s∥2V¯−1s +2∥ζs∥2V¯−1s ∧1) ≤ 8λ ((1+C2)X2a,T +Λ2)β aT (δ/4)⎛⎝2 T∑s=0(∥z¯s∥2V¯−1s ∧ 12)+2
T∑
s=0(∥ζs∥2V¯−1s ∧ 12)⎞⎠≤ 8
λ
((1+C2)X2a,T +Λ2T )β aT (δ/4)⎛⎝2 T∑s=0(∥z¯s∥2V¯−1s ∧1)+2
T∑
s=0(∥ζt∥2V¯−1s ∧ 12)⎞⎠
Substituting the first term of the last expression by the result
of Lemma 3, completes the proof.
The following Lemma provides the upper bound for ∣R3∣.
Lemma 7: Given R3 defined by (16), then we have:
1(F∩E)∣R3∣ ≤ 8√λ ((1+C2)X2a,T +Λ2)SD√β aT (δ/4)⎛⎝2log det(V¯T )det(λ I) + T∑s=0(∥ζs∥2V¯−1s ∧ 12)⎞⎠
1/2√
T
(46)
Proof: Proof directly follows the proof of Lemma 13
in [13], however, for the sake of completeness we provide it
here.
1(F∩E)∣R3∣ ≤ 1(F∩E)⎛⎝ T∑s=0∥P(Θ˜s)(Θ˜s−Θ∗)T zas∥2⎞⎠
1/2×
⎛⎝ T∑s=0(∥P(Θ˜s)1/2Θ˜Ts zas∥+∥P(Θ˜s)1/2ΘT∗zas∥)2⎞⎠
1/2
(47)
applying the result of Lemma 4 and boundedness assumption
of P and Θ˜t completes the proof.
Notice that the term det(V¯T ) appearing in the regret bound
analysis needs to be expressed as an explicit function of za
and the attack signal ζ . Lemma 2 deals with this concern.
By taking the above bounds together the regret bound Ra
for the attacked system can be written as:
Ra ≤ 2DW 2√2T log 8δ +n√B′a,δ+2DX2a,T (n+m) log2(1+2T /λ(X2a,T (1+C2)+Λ))+ 8√
λ
((1+C2)X2a,T +Λ2T )sD√β aT (δ/4)
⎛⎝2log det(V¯T )det(λ I) + T∑s=0(∥ζs∥2V¯−1s ∧ 12)⎞⎠
1/2√
T (48)
where, on E ∩ F we can substitute det(V¯T ) by result of
Lemma 2. There is still one more required step which is
obtaining an upper bound for xat . To do this, we first need
to define Fa. To start with, following same steps as of the
unattacked setting presented in [13], our aim is bounding∥ xat ∥ from above when Θ˜at is an estimate of Θ∗ and Ea
holds with high probability. In [13] it has been shown
that ∥ (Θ∗− Θ˜t)T zt∥ is well controlled except for a finite
number of times. We denote the set of such time instants
occurring between 0 and T as the elements of the set τT
which has maximum cardinality of n+m. Same justification
is applicable for ∥ (Θ∗− Θ˜at )T zat ∥ in the attacked setting.
By decoupling the well-controlled and not well-controlled
state update rules, the recursion of system can be written as
follow:
xat+1 = Γtxat + rat+1 (49)
where
Γt+1 = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩A˜
a
t + B˜at K(Θ˜at ) t /∈ τT
A∗+B∗K(Θ˜at ) t ∈ τT (50)
and
rat+1 = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩M
a
t z
a
t +ωt+1 t /∈ τT
ωt+1 t ∈ τT (51)
By propagating the state back to time step zero, the state
update equation can be written as:
xat = t−1∏
s=0Γas xa0+
t∑
k=1(
t−1∏
s=kΓas)rak (52)
From Assumptions 2 and 3 we have; max
t≤T ∥ A˜t+B˜t K(Θ˜t)∥≤ρ and
max
t≤T ∥ A∗+B∗K(Θ˜t)∥≤η. Since we have at most n+m not well-
controlled system, we can write:
t−1∏
s=k ∥ Γas∥ ≤ ηn+mρ t−k−(m+n) (53)
Now, assuming xa0 = 0 (without loss of generality) and
taking norm from both sides of (52) and applying (53) we
can write:
∥xat ∥ ≤ 11−ρ (ηρ )n+m max0≤k≤t−1(∥rak+1∥)
Given (51), it yields:
max
0≤k<t ∥rak+1∥ ≤ max0≤k<t,k/∈τT ∥Ma,Tk zak∥+max0≤k<t ∥ωk+1∥
Finding bounds for the two terms on right hand side of (54)
completes the analysis for this part. We need the following
lemma to this aim.
Lemma 8: For all t ≤ T , we have
max
0≤k≤t ∥Ma,Tk z¯k∥ ≤ β at (δ/4)1/2 (54)
Proof: The proof directly follows from [13].
Attaining an upper bound for the term max
0≤k<t,k/∈τT ∥Ma,Tk zak∥ is
a quite similar task to bounding max
0≤k<t,k/∈τT ∥MTk zk∥ which has
been provided in Lemma 18 of [13]. Therefore, for the sake
of brevity by skipping a few steps we briefly sketch the proof.
Following lemma provides this bound.
Lemma 9: For all t ≤ T , we have
max
k≤t,/∈τt ∥Ma,Tk zak∥ ≤ 2sΛ+G(Zat +Λ) n+mn+m+1 β at (δ/4)1/2(n+m+1)
(55)
where Zat =maxs≤t ∥zas∥.
Proof: Adopted from lemma 18 of [13], we have:
∥Ma,Tk z¯k∥ ≤ (m+n)εa ∥z¯k∥+2S√n+mU 1εn+ma ×
max
1≤i<i(k)∥Ma,Tti z¯k∥ (56)
which yields:
max
k≤t,/∈τt ∥Ma,Tk z¯k∥ ≤ (m+n)εa maxk≤t,/∈τt (∥zak∥+∥ζk∥)+
2S
√
n+m
U
1
εn+ma maxk≤t,/∈τt max1≤i<i(k)∥Ma,Tti z¯k∥≤ (m+n)εa(Zak +Λk)+
2S
√
n+m
U
1
εn+ma max0≤k≤t ∥Ma,Tk z¯k∥ (57)
where εa is chosen as:
εa = ( 2Sβ at (δ/4)
Z¯t(n+m)1/2U1/20 H1/2 )1/(n+m+1)
By applying Lemma 8 we have:
max
k≤t,/∈τt ∥Ma,Tk z¯k∥ ≤GZ¯ n+mn+m+1k β at (δ/4)1/2(n+m+1)≤G(Zak +Λk) n+mn+m+1k β at (δ/4)1/2(n+m+1)
(58)
where
Zak =maxs≤k ∥zat ∥
and
G = 2(2S(n+m)n+m+1/2
U1/2 )
1/(n+m+1)
.
Finally, (58) yields:
max
k≤t,/∈τt ∥Ma,Tk zak∥ ≤ 2SΛk +G(Zak +Λk) n+mn+m+1k β at (δ/4)1/2(n+m+1)
which completes proof.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ n and k ≤ t sub-gaussianity assumption of ω , with
probability 1−δ/(t(t +1)) gives:
∣ωk,i∣ ≤ L√2log t(t +1)δ
on some event G and with P(G) ≥ 1−δ/4 we have:
∥ωt∥ ≤ L√n log 4nt(t +1)δ (59)
Considering the definition of F , the statement G∩E ⊂ F ∩E
holds. Hence, we have P(G∩E) ≤ δ/2.
Given (54), (55) and (55) we have:
∥xat ∥ ≤ 11−ρ (ηρ )n+m(G(Zat +Λt) n+mn+m+1 β at (δ/4)1/2(n+m+1)
×2L√n log 4nt(t +1)
δ
) (60)
where
ZaT =maxs≤T ∥zas∥ , U = U0H , U0 = 116n+m−2(1∨S2(n+m−2))
H > (16∨ 4S2M2(n+m)U0 ), G = 2(2S(n+m)n+m+1/2U1/2 )
1/(n+m+1)
which allows us to define αat in (37a ).
IV. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we investigate the performance of al-
gorithm 1 for three settings of non-attacked system, self-
corrective (aware) and naive (unaware) attacked systems.
This self-corrective algorithm, whose properties have been
established above is equipped with an adaptive confidence set
adjustment that takes into account the possible attack. This
feature distinguishes the so-called self-corrective algorithm
from the naive one whose performance has already been de-
picted and discussed in section III and Figure 2. We consider
the control system (22) to examine self-corrective algorithm
and unattacked setting in order to carry out a comparison
between the three settings. We apply the incremental gradient
descent method, given in [17] to approximately solve the
optimization problem (10). The projected Newton method,
Θ˜t ← PROJCt(δ)(Θ˜t −αHΘ(Tr(P(Θ)))−1∇Θ(Tr(P(Θ))))
(61)
is applied to solve the constrained optimization problem
represented in (10). ∇Θ f and and HΘ f are the gradient and
Fig. 3: Corrective Algorithm performance in the presence of attack
Hessian of f with respect to Θ. Ct(Θ) is the confidence
set, PROJg is Euclidean projection on g and finally α is the
step size. The computation of Hessian and ∇Θ as well as
formulation of projection has been explicited in [17].
It has graphically been shown in [17] that the objective
function J(Θ) =Tr(P(Θ)) is generally non convex and when
it comes to one dimensional system (n, m = 1) it is only
convex in drift matrix, A.
The gradient sub-routine takes 200 steps to solve each
OFU optimization problem where projection algorithm is
applied until the projected point lies inside the confidence
ellipsoid. Figure 3 shows the performance of corrective
algorithm which has the privilege of adjusting its confidence
set according to (27). As can be seen in the figure, in the
presence of attack, the corrective algorithm is able to keep
its estimates close to the unknown parameters of the system.
On the other hand, as demonstrated in Figure 2 the naive
algorithm which sticks to the confidence set (8), gradually
fails to keep its estimates within a reasonable neighborhood
of the true parameters’ value.
Figure 4 carries out a comparison between the imposed
regret of the discussed algorithms. As it is expected, the
regret is O(√T) in the absence of attack and the corrective
algorithm outperforms the naive one (Figure 2(bottom)) in
dealing with attack which is due to the poor estimation of
naive algorithm.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied an attacked-in-the-loop
learning-based LQ adaptive control system where the system
parameters are not known. We constructed a highly reliable
confidence set around unknown parameters that enables the
algorithm to keep its estimates close to true parameters
Fig. 4: Regret of corrective algorithm vs unattacked setting
in the presence of poisonous data injection into database.
Furthermore, a regret bound analysis for the attacked setting
is provided to give a measure for attack regret. Simula-
tion results demonstrate the performance of the algorithm
equipped with the new confidence set. Designing defense
mechanism against simultaneous sensor and actuator attacks
is the subject of a future research.
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